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PERFORMANCE INDICES TO AID
NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFEGUARD
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
John W. Lathrop
I. INTRODUCTION
The management of a national or international nuclear material safe-
guard system involves large numbers of very complex strategic and tacti-
cal decisions at several organizational levels. This report outlines a deci-
sion analytic approach to developing decision aids to assist the various
decision makers in the material accounting part of that process. The
intent of the report is to layout a very generaL simple conceptual frame-
work for such decision aids. While the framework combines the most
basic ideas of decision analysis, game theory, and signal detection theory,
the nature of the approach has been kept at an easily understandable
level, in order to enhance its chances of implementation in the real world
of nuclear safeguard management. As a result, this framework does not
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begin to approach the thoroughness and sophistication of recent statisti-
cal treatments of the problem, such as the work of Avenhaus (1977).
Instead, the approach presented here emphasizes a simple conceptual
structure built around the basic idea set out in Bennet, Murphey, and
Sherr (1975): safeguard management should be guided by some measure
of the societal risk or social utility that results from the operation of the
safeguard system.
This document is a status report, representing a very small number
of person-days of effort. It describes a very "quick and dirty" first cut at
the problem, to give the people who would be involved in the implementa-
tion of these decision aids an opportunity to criticize and comment at a
very early stage.
As is typical of a decision analytic approach, the suggested decision
aids are built around a set of performance indices. Section II presents
the roles the set of indices would play in the safeguard management pro-
cess, while Section III lays out the nature of decision problems involved.
Then in Section IV a particular set of indices is suggested and described.
Section V discusses some of the most significant problems to be con-
fronted in implementing any set of decision aids. The paper concludes
with a suggested agenda for developing, testing, and implementing the
decision aids.
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II. ROLES OF PERFORMANCE INDlCES
In the most general way, a system of performance indices developed
within a decision analysis framework can serve to bring a certain rational-
ity, or at least self-consistency. to a system that might otherwise exhibit
inconsistencies often found in ad hoc, bureaucratic and political systems.
While this general role may in fact result in the most important contribu-
tion of a set of performance indices, this section will briefly describe
more specific roles of the indices. Performance indices can aid safeguard
management decisions at each of three levels:
• low-level allocation of inspection resources;
• higher-level evaluation of safeguard approaches and system-
wide efficiency testing;
• assisting in highest-level determination of adequacy of the
overall safeguard system.
Because each of these decision levels can involve a different type of
index, they are treated separately in the following subsections.
A. Allocation of Inspection Resources
The allocation of inspection resources can best be gUided by an
importance index over diversion possibilities (DP's) that indicates the
relative importance of safeguarding each DP. Such an index could be
used:
• to aid decisions involving the distribution of frequency and type
of inspections:
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• to develop instructions to inspectors;
• to set inspection goals.
B. Safeguard Approach Evaluation
The evaluation of safeguard approaches calls for a performance
index that aggregates the effectiveness of the safeguards over all known
DP's in each nuclear facility. Such an index could be used to evaluate:
• generic safeguard approaches,
• actual, facility-specific safeguard approaches.
• particular inspector actions.
Once a performance index is developed, it can be used to seek effi-
cient allocation of resources by guiding re-allocations of safeguard effort
to maximize the index for a given budget.
c. Aiding the Determination of Safeguard Adequacy
The evaluation of the entire national or international safeguard sys-
tem requires a performance index that aggregates the effectiveness of
safeguards over all safeguarded facilities. Such an index could be used in
a determination of whether or not the overall safeguard budget is large
enough for the system to perform adequately. It would be possible to
develop an index that determines adequacy directly. That index would
incorporate the crucial cost-vs-safety tradeoff within the inner workings
of its calculations. However, it would probably be much more defensible
to develop an index that measures overall system performance in terms
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of resulting safety aside from its cost. then leave the cost-vs-safety
debate to the political process. In order to be the most helpful for such a
debate, the index would express the level of safety resulting from the sys-
tem in terms meaningful to the participants in that political process,
such as an overall probability of detection given diversion of one signifi-
cant quantity (SQ).
ID. THE NATURE OF THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROBLEM
The development of performance indices requires that a series of
very difficult questions be asked concerning just how performance should
be evaluated. and just what is it that constitutes good performance. This
section presents some of those questions and considerations.
A. Ultimate Value Dimensions
The performance of a safeguard system is multidimensional. In addi-
tion, there are several levels at which the safeguard system can be
described multidimensionally. At the lowest level. which we can call level
N, the descriptive dimensions are the observables: frequency and types
of inspections. numbers of anomalous situation indications (ASI's). cam-
era performance. etc. While it may be relatively easy to describe a safe-
guard system on these directly observable dimensions. such a description
is far removed from what the managers of the safeguard system and its
participant organizations actually care about.
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At the highest level. which we can name Level 1, performance
description is relatively straightforward: whether or not a nuclear
weapon made with diverted material is used for warfare, political pres-
sure, or economic blackmail. But that level is too high for material
accounting safeguard performance indices, since it involves a much
larger system of political checks and balances than the material account-
ing safeguard system alone, whose function is simply to "ring the bell."
One step down from this level. Level II. we can identify more narrowly
defined, more easily measurable description dimensions. One especially
simple example set of dimensions at Level II can be listed if one assumes
that no more than one diversion and no more than one alarm could occur
per year:
• annual probability of correct detection before a weapon is built
(early correct alarm. ECA),
• annual probability of correct detection, but not until after a
weapon is built (late correct alarm, LCA).
• annual probability that a diversion of more than one SQ occurs
without detection (false rejection, FR),
• annual probability that a diversion is reported that did not in
fact occur (false alarm, FA).
Given the above assumptions, the complement of the sum of these proba-
bilities is the annual probability the system remains correctly silent
(correct rejection, CR). A more complete set of dimensions would break
each probability down by amount diverted, and would allow for multiple
diversions and alarms per year. All of the above probabilities are annual.
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and are absolute, Le., not conditioned on a diversion taking place. This
absoluteness is desirable in that it allows the performance description to
include the safeguard system's power to deter a diversion attempt. How-
ever, such absolute probabilities cannot be calculated without involving
debatable assumptions that may degrade the credibility of the perfor-
mance descriptions. It may be desirable, on balance, to step down one
more step in performance description, to Level III. and change the upper
three probabilities to be conditional on a diversion. The descriptive
dimensions at Levels II and III are very close to what the safeguard
managers (and the society they are protecting) care about concerning
safeguards. and so can be referred to as value dimensions.
This discussion has the effect of outlining the requirements for the
process models that must support a system of performance indices:
Those models must take as inputs the observables of Level N and deliver
as outputs a set of descriptors at Level III or Level II.
B. Value Tradeoffs and Attitude Toward Uncertainty
The previous subsection described sets of four value dimensions that
can be used to describe the performance of a safeguard system. Cer-
tainly the four descriptors should be presented as a set to the appropri-
ate decision makers reviewing the performance of the system. However,
any decisions involving the comparison of two safeguard approaches or
suggested changes in the system must involve the aggregation of the four
(or whatever number) of descriptors into a single index of overall perfor-
mance, either implicitly or explicitly. Without such a single index. one
cannot say "system A is better than system B," or even "system A is
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efficient." strictly speaking.
The step from several descriptors to one index is a step from
description to evaluation. That step cannot be taken without making
some value tradeoffs between the value dimensions, and incorporating
some attitude toward uncertainty. For example, suppose a reallocation
of inspection resources is being considered that would increase inspec-
tion frequency on some activities and drop some other inspection activi-
ties. At Level III, the decision on whether or not to make that reallocation
can be represented as a choice between sets of probabilities such as the
following (all conditional on "div," a diversion taking place):
p(ECAldiv)
{ .1
p(LCAldiv)
.6
p(FRldiv)
.3 }
p(ECAldiv)
{ .4
p(LCAldiv)
.25
p(FRldiv)
.35 }
The choice as to whether the left or right set is preferable requires value
tradeoffs and some particular attitude toward uncertainty.
Process models would allow the mapping of value tradeoffs and atti-
tude toward uncertainty at Level III down into lower levels, where they
may have more meaning for tactical decisions. Two examples of tactical
decisions requiring value tradeoffs:
1) You have two unsafeguarded diversion possibilities (DP's). one
involving 16 kg Pu, the other 8 kg Pu. For the amount remaining
in your budget, you can get an 80% detection probability on the
16 kg DP, or a 99% detection possibility on the 8 kg DP, Which
do you choose?
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2) Suppose DP 1 involves 1 SQ, and DP2 involves 9 SQ, yet DP1 is 9
times more likely to be attempted than DP2. Both have a detec-
tion probability of 30%. For the amount remaining in your
budget. you can increase the detection probability in one or the
other to 40%. Which do you choose?
The value tradeoffs and uncertainty attitude involved in the above
dilemmas do not have an agreed-upon objective basis. They represent
social value tradeoffs that must be made, implicitly or explicitly, in the
course of managing a safeguard system. A set of performance indices
would incorporate the less crucial values in a structured, systematic way,
using tradeoffs and uncertainty attitudes elicited from the appropriate
decision makers by means of accepted decision analytic techniques. The
most crucial value tradeoff, cost-vs-safety, can be left out of the index
system, to be decided by the appropriate political debate. The index sys-
tem can, however, help to structure that debate and couch it in the per-
formance evaluation terms most meaningful for the participants.
c. Structure Between Evaluation and Safeguard Management Deci-
sions
There is a basic structure linking the value tradeoffs discussed in the pre-
vious section with the safeguard management decisions to be aided by the
performance indices. That structure is most clearly presented in the
form of a decision tree, as shown in Figure 1. The square nodes in the fig-
ure represent decision points, manned from left to right by the inspector,
his supervisors, then the highest-level safeguard manager. The circular
nodes represent random events. For example, if the inspector rejects a
- 10 -
signal as not significant, it may either be a false rejection of a real diver-
sion, or a correct rejection, with a positive probability for each. For clar-
ity, the CA in Figure 1 represents a correct alarm, whether it is early or
late.
accept, tes t
FR
CR
accept, test
Figure 1.
CR
1------ ｾ FCAAalarm if-
FR
CR
The decision tree in Figure 1 displays the ultimate outputs of a safe-
guard system (tightly linked to a Level III performance description) and
how they are linked to signal detection decisions. Safeguard manage-
ment decisions affect the discriminability of the signal detection systems
used by each decision maker (d' in signal detection theory (SDT) nota-
tion), and can affect the criteria used to accept or reject a signal (f3 in
SDT notation. a quantity different from the (3 of safeguard terminology.
See Egan 1975). Section N presents a system of indices which evaluate
probability distributions over the safeguard outputs indicated in Figure 1
in ways that can be used as very direct guidance for safeguard manage-
- 11 -
ment decisions.
D. Requirements of a System of Performance Indices
A system of performance indices must fulfill the roles outlined in
Section II, incorporating the value dimensions and tradeoffs mentioned
in subsections A and B above in the structure presented in subsection C
above. But beyond all that, there are requirements that the index system
must meet in order to be feasible and useful. These are listed here.
1. The index system must treat the diverter as a gamesman.
A system of performance indices must treat the diverter as one who
will react to the safeguard system to maximize his own gain. Any index
system that treats the diverter as if he is blind to safeguard measures will
have serious problems with defensibility.
2. The index system must be understandable.
In order for the performance index system to be useful, it must be
accepted and easily understood by all those who use it. That means the
system must be relatively straightforward, with a clear and logical struc-
ture, even at the cost of some decision-theoretic rigor.
3. The index system must be compatible with a feasible and realistic
inspection and data gathering system.
The index system must be able to use the inspection system as it
currently operates. It must also be able to identify feasible and politi-
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cally realistic improvements in that system.
IV. A SUGGESTED SYSTEM: OF PERFORMANCE INDICES
The previous sections have presented guidelines and requirements
that should be fulfilled by any system of performance indices. In this sec-
tion. one suggested system is'put forward as an illustration of what an
index system might look like.
A. Overall Structure
In keeping with the three levels of roles presented in Section II. the
suggested index system has three levels:
1. Diversion Possibility Level: Games Aga.inst the Diverter
At this level, a utility function for the diverter. UD' is used as an
importance index. attaching a measure of diverter attractiveness to each
DPi given safeguard approach SAj : UD (DPi ISAj ). This function takes
into account the probability of detection and diversion success. as well as
value to the diverter of the various possible outcomes and the technical
difficulty. complexity. and cost to the diverter. In allocating detection
resources among DPi's, one simple principle is to select the SAj that
makes the UD(DPi ISAj ) values as equal as possible across DPi's. The
- 13 -
reasoning here is that the diverter will strike at the "weakest link" in the
safeguard defense, which is the DPi, most attractive to him (Le., with the
highest Uv (DPi, ISAj )). By this reasoning, detection resources are best
spent in decreasing the attractiveness of the DPi with the highest
Uv(DP.j,1 SAj ) ..
While this level of index is intended to guide allocation of detection
resources over detection possibilities. that does not provide direct gui-
dance for allocation of inspection resources. A paper by Dlvila (19BO)
describes the relationship between DP's and inspection activities. and in
doing so, casts some light on the problems of translating resource alloca-
tions over DP's into allocations of inspection activities.
2. Safeguard Approach Level: Seeking Efficiency
At this level. a utility function for society, Us' is developed as an
index of how well society is served on the Level III value dimensions by the
safeguard approach, SAj' The Us (SAj ) can be used to seek efficiency by
reallocating inspection resources and adjusting alarm threshold points
until Us (SAj ) is maximized for a given budget level.
3. Safeguard System Adequacy Level: Aiding the Debate
The Us index can be applied at a system-wide level to measure the
maximum achievable system performance for each of several budget lev-
els. These performance-cost pairs can then be presented to the political
decision making process for a decision on which pair to implement (Le ..
- 14-
which budget level to set). Rather than present the performance of the
system in the rather abstract units of Us' a more meaningful numeraire
could be used, such as the overall probability of detection given diversion
of one SQ that corresponds to that value of Us' This process very care-
fully leaves the cost-vs-safety tradeoff in the domain of political process.
The relationship between efficiency and adequacy determinations is
illustrated in Figure 2. In the figure, a carefully defined probability of
detection is used as a meaningful numeraire for US, The dots represent
probability
of detection
opportunity frontier
Figure 2.
originally proposed safeguard systems, at three different budget levels.
The arrows indicate the adjustment of each of those systems to maximize
Us subject to the budget constraint. The opportunity frontier represents
all possible efficient performance-cost pairs. The entire frontier would
never actually be plotted. The political process would debate only over
which of the three efficient systems to select. The outcome of each
year's budget debate could be used to guide the selection of the subse-
quent ye ar' s three trial systems.
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B. Utility for the Diverter, UD
The diverter cannot know before the attempt what its outcome will
be. His choice among DP's is a case of decision making under uncer-
tainty. where risk aversion may be important. An appropriate way to
represent his preference, then, is with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function, Uct' over the possible outcomes. His utility for a diversion possi-
bility, UD (DPi ISAj ), is then the expectation over his utilities of the possi-
ble outcomes. The outcome utility function for the diverter, Uct' can be
considered a function of the number of SQ's diverted, when, if ever, he is
detected, and the technical difficulty, cost and complexity of the DP. The
utility function should not represent the preferences of a normative
diverter, but should be as descriptive as possible of actual diverter choice
behavior. With this in mind, the utility function should be additive, since
there is ample experimental evidence of the descriptive validity of such a
preference model (Dawes and Corrigan 1974). Beyond this question of
structure, wherever possible the Uct function should be elicited by wholis-
tic judgments, again to maintain descriptive validity.
In order to keep the 'Uct function as simple as possible, while still cap-
turing the essential aspects of the situation it is to describe, its argument
space could be numbers of SQ diverted (denoted X) crossed with three
detection times (denoted ｾ ｢ ･ ｦ ｯ ｲ ･ Ｌ after, neved for before the diverter has
built a weapon, after that, and never) crossed with perhaps four levels of
technical difficulty-complexity-cost, described by paragraphs or simply
by equivalent monetary cost (denoted C, with Ci the cost of DPi ).
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In sum, then, the diverter's utility for a diversion possibility given a
safeguard approach, UD(DPi ISA;j)' is his expected utility over the uncer-
tainty the diverter faces: whether or not he will succeed in getting x SQ's
and when if ever he will be detected. Equation (1) displays that
UD(DPi ISA;j) for the simple case when amount diverted can only be x or
zero:
p (x ,never IDPi ,SA;j)'Uct (x,never,q)
+ p (x,a/ter IDPi,SA;j) . Uct (x,a/ter,Ci )
+ p (x ,be/are IDPi.SA;j) . Uct (x,be/are,Ci )
+ 'P (0 ,never IDPi ,SA;j) . Uct (a ,never ,Ci )
+ 'P (a,a/ter IDPi.SA;j) . ud (o,a/ter,Ci )
+ 'P (0 ,be/ore \DPi,SA;j) . Uct (o,be/ore,Ci )·
(1)
c. Utility for Society. Us
At the time a safeguard approach must be selected, there is substan-
tial uncertainty concerning the magnitude of the diversion threat and the
effectiveness of that approach in meeting the threat. As was the case
with the diverter's choice among DP's, then, a choice among safeguard
approaches is a case of decision making under uncertainty. where risk
aversion may be important, so an appropriate way to represent society
preferences over approaches is with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function, us' over the possible outcomes. The utility for society of a safe-
guard approach, Us (SAj ), is then the expectation over the societal utili-
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ties of the possible outcomes. Up until this point there have been marked
similarities between UD and Us' and between Uct and us' However, the
outcome utility function for society, us' is basically different from Uct in
that it should be prescriptive, not descriptive. To take the most simple
case, the Us argument space could be amount diverted, X, crossed with a
five-value performance variable, which we will call R (for "response"), tak-
ing values ｾ ｃ ｒ Ｌ ECA, LCA, FR, FAj corresponding to those responses dis-
cussed in terms of the Level II and III description dimensions presented in
Section III. In keeping with the Level III dimensions, the utility for society
for a safeguard approach, SAj , or even for the entire safeguard system
can be an expectation conditional on a diversion ("div") taking place,
US(SAj ) = l: P (xlc:,rl I SAj , div) . Us (Xlc:,rl)'
1:.&
where
(2)
P (xk ,rl I SA;, div) = l: P (xk ,rl I SAj , DPi ) . p (DPi I SAj , dw),(3)
,;
and where
(4)
Equation (4) is borrowed from the experimental psychology literature on
stochastic choice, and is commonly referred to as the Luce choice model
(1959). While more elaborate choice models could be employed, in view of
the great uncertainties involved in the formulation of UD' a large choice
modeling effort would probably not be justified.
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The astute reader will note that the idea of equating the
UD(DPi ISAj ) over DPi . presented in Section IV.A.1 as a way to game
against the diverter. is a technically superfluous feature of the proposed
optimization process. This is because optimizing Us (SAj ) will in fact allo-
cate resources across DPi in a desirable way. accounting for differences
in P (:Z:k,Tl I SAj.DPi ) and 'Us (:Z:k.Tl)' as well as differences in
UD (DPi ISAj ). and allowing for some noise in the diverter's choi"ce
behavior. The equating of UD (DPi ISAj )'s is retained as an optional.
separate guide to low-level resource allocation because its simplicity and
logic make it a more implementable policy guide than the more obscure
Equations (2) through (4). especially in a decentralized safeguard system.
An additional use of 'Us (technically contained in the above equations
but hardly apparent by inspection) is in the setting of threshold points for
the accept-reject decisions represented in the decision tree of Figure 1.
To make a clear example, consider the last decision node on the right in
that tree. assume only one possible diverted amount :z:, and consider
early and late correct alarms as equivalent (denoted CA). It is easily
shown from signal detection theory (Egan 1975), or more directly by sim-
ply equating expected utilities. that the evidence should be accepted as
indicating an alarm should be sounded when the probability of diversion
given the evidence. p (:z: I evid.) is such that
p (x I evid) ｾ Us (0 ,CR) - 'Us (0 ,FA)
1-p (:z: I evid) Us (:z: .CA) - Us (:z: .FR) (5)
Naturally, more complicated expressions are required for more than one
possible amount diverted, for when the detection time (early vs late)
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matters, and for the intermediate detection decision stages. However.
the basic idea stands that the optimal accept-reject threshold point is a
function of the social utilites of the possible outcomes.
The last paragraph serves to illustrate the pervasive usefulness of
this system of performance indices. It can be used to decide whether to
use more funds to increase discriminability and lower the false alarm
rate. or to increase the detection rate. or to use the funds to reduce
detection time. It can be used to optimize the staging of the detection
system illustrated in Figure 1. It can be used under politically set con-
straints, such as a maximum false alarm rate, to find the optimal settings
of the unconstrained parameters. Then it can be used to measure the
social cost of that politically set constraint!
D. Information Requirements
Perhaps the most important thing to remember about this perfor-
mance index system is that it does not by itself generate any guidance for
safeguard management. All it does is provide a logical, self-consistent
framework for moving from collecting the required basic information to
making the required decisions. There are two basic types of information
called for: value information and technical information.
- 20-
1. Value Information
The Uct and Us functions must be elicited from the appropriate indivi-
duals. There is a well-established methodology for doing this elicitation
(Keeney and Raiffa 1976), but a problem does remain in identifying and
reaching the appropriate individuals. One does not need to elicit Uct from
an actual diverter. but simply from an expert who could represent the
preferences of a diverter. While the elicitation of value information may
seem somewhat speculative in nature, it in fact is a strong feature of the
suggested approach. Any approach that does not include such value elici-
tation must then assume some particular form for ｾ and Uct. either
explicitly or implicitly, without the benefit a structured value elicitation.
2. Technical Information
For each DP. a probability distribution must be estimated for the
argument domain for us' X crossed with R. A methodology for eliciting
such probability distributions from experts is described in Spetzler and
Stael von Holstein (1975). In addition to this prob abilistic information, a
"cost" to the diverter, including technical difficulty and complexity, must
be estimated for each DP. That cost can be expressed in monetary units
or in a set of four or five paragraphs, each describing a particular level of
difficulty in a general enough way to apply to all DP's.
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V. PROBLEMS lfITH PERFORMANCE INDICES
A. Dynamics of the Safeguard Process
An analysis of safeguard management as a static system may miss
crucial aspects of the long-term safeguard process. As one example. con-
sider the social preference (us) ranking of a false alarm versus a false
rejection. A value elicitation in a static analysis may reveal a preference
for the false alarm. Yet when the dynamics of the situation are taken into
account. including the possible dismantling of the safeguard system in
response to too many false alarms. it may be that in particular cases the
false rejection is preferable. Clearly, this matter requires much more
thought.
B. Differences in Values and Goals
Perhaps costs to the operator should be included in the analyses.
However. it is not clear exactly how that cost would enter into Us. and
how much weight it should be given, relative to other arguments. In fact
this particular dimension highlights a broader problem: what to do in
cases where there is a clear difference between the values prescriptively
ascribed to the society being protected, and the values of the safeguard
system management agency. It could very well be the case, for example,
that the institutional structure and incentives of the safeguard system
agency causes its management to be more sensitive to operator cost than
are members of the protected public. Of course, this problem is not one
caused by the analysis. The problem has its roots in the institutional
- 22-
structure involved. However, the system of performance indices makes
the values and goals of the system more explicit, and in doing so may
draw attention to the problem.
c. Different Diverter Types
If an index system is to be responsive to the real world, it must ack-
nowledge that there are different diverters out there. A system optim-
ized against one diverter type is not optimized against the spectrum of
possible diverters. The normative answer is to optimize the system
against a probability distribution over diverter types. It would, of course,
be quite difficult to obtain the necessary estimates of that distribution.
One promising approach to alleviate this problem may lie in the develop-
ment of a concept of resilience.
D. lnlormation Loss in Aggregation
Any set of indices. by its very aggregative nature, must lose informa-
tion. The point is to keep only that part of the information necessary to
make management decisions. But particular features may be missed
that are valuable in finding solutions to problems. One example was sug-
gested by Frank Houk of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:
suppose system performance plunges due to a flurry of reliability prob-
lems with cameras, The cause of the plunge may be lost in the indices,
which only relay the plunge itself.
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VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The system of performance indices presented here exists in outline
form only. There is much to do in order to implement such a system.
The mathematics must be expanded to handle more general cases than
those used as examples in this text. An actual large-scale safeguard sys-
tem should be examined in some detail to investigate problems of compa-
tibility between the indices and the system. Value elicitations should be
performed, and the indices re-worked to handle surprises discovered in
those elicitations. Then example and demonstration applications should
be carried out, using utility functions fitted to the value elicitations. All
of these steps should be carried out in close cooperation with the ulti-
mate users of the indices in order to enhance the usefulness and accep-
tance of the indices. That cooperation can be continued past the metho-
dological demonstrations to for)'.1l the basis of the ultimate implementa-
tion of the indices.
The set of performance indices proposed here offers substantial
promise as a system of decision aids for nuclear material safeguard
management. Perhaps the strongest point of the approach is its simple
conceptual structure, which promotes a ready understanding of the
indices by its users and makes possible a realistic, multi-staged imple-
mentation strategy.
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